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Air traffic has substantially increased since the introduction of
deregulation in both the USA and the European Union. Moreover,
aircraft accidents involving fatalities have exhibited a downward
trend over time. Still, a series of recently publicized accidents has
raised again a serious issue, namely whether cost reduction in a
deregulated aviation environment is achieved at the expense of
safety standards. To address this question, the paper proposes a
mathematical model, which highlights the relationship between
competitive behaviour and tort liability. The model has important
policy implications suggesting that the level of airline penalisation
should be reduced when market rivalry is relaxed and conversely.
[JEL Classification: L19, L21, L40, L59, L93]
1. - Introduction
In August 2005 a Boeing 737-300 of Cyprus-based Helios
Airways crashed northeast of Athens, Greece, killing everybody
onboard (121 passengers and crew). This was the most serious
aviation accident ever in Greece and received great attention by
the media. Not surprisingly, the popular argument about the
adverse effects of airline deregulation on aviation safety due to
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of the authors.cost reduction practices was used. Some people raised concerns
about the safety standards of low fare and charter airlines,
whereas political voices against the privatisation (or closure) of
the two loss-making flag carriers, that is Olympic Airlines of
Greece and Cyprus Airways of Cyprus, received support.
Nonetheless, statistics provided by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) do not produce supportive evidence of increased
passenger fatalities at a global level (ICAO, 2005) since the mid 1980s,
i.e. when liberalisation in the airline business was gradually
introduced worldwide. In 1986, 24 accidents involving fatalities were
reported where 641 passengers were killed, that is 0.04 fatalities per
100 million of passenger-km. In 1996, there were again 24 accidents
with 1,146 fatalities, that is 0.05 per 100 million of passenger-km but
in 2003 there were only 6 accidents (down from 14 in 2002) involving
334 fatalities, that is 0.01 per 100 million of passenger-km (ICAO
2005). On the other hand, a recent study by Raghavan - Rhoades
(2005) reveals that accident rates (when considering departure
numbers) have increased in the US airline industry since the
deregulation of the market in 1978 at least when the total number
of accidents is considered and not just the fatal ones. Moreover, many
safety problems emerge (or at least become known to the passengers)
only in the case of an accident. Although competitive forces may
discipline airlines to operate safely in a self-regulated environment,
market failures and the increasingly important link between safety
and security render some type of system surveillance necessary at
national, international and supranational levels. In this context and
following pressure from consumer groups, the European Union
introduced a regularly-updated black list of banned airlines in 2005
(Knorr, 2006), while ICAO urges regulators to classify airlines into
five categories regarding the integration of safety into their business
model (Fisher, 2005).
1.1 Adverse and Positive Effects of Airline Deregulation on Safety
Although not ample, the existing academic literature covers
several aspects regarding the implications of air transport
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222deregulation for safety. First, there are several theoretical
arguments, which stress the possible adverse effects of
deregulation on the safety of airline operations. Competitive
pressures may induce airlines to relax maintenance procedures
and checks to reduce costs; outsourcing of maintenance and
training functions may result in a loss of direct quality control;
long flying hours, shorter turnaround times and staff shortages
may result in mechanical failures, labour fatigue and pilot errors
as well as low morale among cabin crew due to unsympathetic
rostering (Icon Consulting et al., 2001). Moreover, the need to raise
aircraft utilisation factors to achieve economies of density may
induce airlines to switch to smaller aircraft and/or operate a hub-
and-spoke network (Rose, 1992). These commercial decisions may
result in increased airport congestion and overload of air traffic
control to the detriment of safety management. Passengers
deprived of direct services between their origin and destination
are obliged to make a stop-over at a hub; hence, individual risk
of suffering from an accident may rise as the number of flights
increases. In some cases, such deprivation may also result in
transport mode substitution mostly in favour of trains and cars;
nonetheless, if these modes are less safe than the airplane, then
the effect of airline deregulation on passenger safety is again
negative (Rose, 1992).
It would be unfair to conclude, however, that airline
deregulation has a negative effect on safety without considering
the converse argumentation. In this context, the emergence and
operational success of low fare airlines primarily in the United
States and Europe belies those who believe that a low fare strategy
is only financially sustainable to the detriment of safety. Airlines
such as Southwest, Ryanair and Easyjet have a very young fleet
of owned aircraft and use experienced and reputable pilots to
minimise training costs. They fly to and out of secondary airports,
hence they help reduce congestion at major airports; moreover,
their direct, point-to-point services offer a good alternative to those
who wish to by-pass a hub airport (Papatheodorou, 2002). In
addition, their reliance on outsourcing of various activities has
been rather unproblematic. Over time, specialist companies have
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by building on economies of scale and scope and capitalising on
their experience, these companies can successfully deliver
outsourced activities at a low cost and without compromising
safety standards (Hirshman et al., 2005).
The truth, however, is that not all low fare airlines have been
as successful as Southwest, Ryanair and Easyjet; in fact,
bankruptcies and market exit in the sector are not unusual:
Debonair, Duo Airlines and Air Polonia are just some examples.
Nonetheless, there is no supportive evidence that low fare or
charter airlines have a systematically higher rate of incidents or
accidents compared to major flag carriers. What seems to matter
here is the existence of a strict regulatory and transparent
framework in both the USA and the EU, which safeguards
compliance to safety standards. This is not necessarily the case in
other areas of the world, where accidents occur irrespectively of
the actual airline business model. Korean Airlines, the country’s
flag carrier, was close to expulsion from Sky Team in 1999 due to
its poor safety record (Icon Consulting et al., 2001).
Deregulation may also activate market mechanisms to
discourage airlines from deliberately compromising safety: the
popular expression «if you think safety is expensive, then try an
accident» conveys this message effectively. The Folk Theorem of
game theory (Gibbons, 1992) is particularly useful in explaining
the impact of an accident on an airline’s financial position. In
particular, an airline’s management team should weigh the short-
term savings of safety reduction against the longer-term damage
in case of an accident. The resulting loss in that airline’s reputation
will most probably lead to a dramatic reduction in its future sales
and a rise in insurance premia (Rose, 1992) and may have a
devastating effect on the airline’s share price (Chance - Ferris,
1987; Borenstein - Zimmerman, 1988). This is particularly the case
when the airline is unable to manage accident crises effectively
(Siomkos, 2000). Therefore, even if an airline is fully covered
against indemnities, it may decide not to under-invest in safety
operations. In addition and to avoid the spreading of negative
reputation beyond the level of an individual company, airline
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(IATA) have introduced strict guidelines for their members and
implement safety certification schemes such as the IATA
Operational Safety Audit (IOSA).
Nonetheless, there are still cases where an airline may
discount the future so heavily that it can make commercial sense
to reduce safety provision at present. Consider an airline, which
is close to bankruptcy or which faces serious liquidity constraints.
In this context, an adequate safety provision may either accentuate
market exit or deny the necessary savings to generate future
investment and organic growth; as a result, the opportunity cost
of cutting safety is rather low. Unfortunately, this argument may
be used by financially robust market incumbents to deter
successful market entry as few new carriers are likely to have full
accessibility to financial markets. This is where detailed and
expensive certification schemes on airworthiness can play a
positive role. Similar to bonding in the tour operations business,
such schemes introduce institutional barriers to entry; given the
sunk cost nature of related expenses, only serious and affluent
investors would be willing to fund a start-up in the airline
business. This very commitment should then convince (partly at
least) the financial markets that it is worth relaxing any existing
liquidity constraints. Likewise, destructive price competition in a
deregulated environment may bring certain airlines closer to
bankruptcy and induce them to revert to malpractice. To avoid
this outcome, and in addition to safeguarding the appropriate use
of airport and other related infrastructure (Moses - Savage, 1990),
civil aviation authorities should heavily penalise predatory (that is
below average cost) pricing and instigate regular financial audits
in collaboration with the competition watchdogs.
1.2 Institutional Intervention and Tort Liability
The above argument suggests that market forces in a
deregulated environment can only discipline airlines if
complemented by a solid institutional framework to address
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and regular safety controls, a compromise of safety standards is
only known to an airline; the passenger becomes aware of it only
in the case of an unfortunate incident or most commonly accident.
In other words, a principal - agent problem seems to exist
(Sappington, 1991): the airline provides an unobserved (by the
passenger) maintenance effort; whereas the passenger observes
only the outcome, that is whether the flight service has been safely
delivered or not. Most passengers are risk averse and face at best
oligopolistic market conditions. Hence, optimal contracting (in
terms of generating the desired by the passenger effort) may
command a price premium: this may provide airlines with an
incentive to increase maintenance effort (and reduce the
probability of an accident) without compromising profitability.
Competitive pressures in a deregulated environment are expected
to reduce this premium on the fare level. Nonetheless, if
passengers perceive price competition as being directly related to
safety (under-)provision, then a typical problem of adverse
selection (Akerlof 1970) may occur leading to the complete
collapse of the airline sector. Hence, private (that is airline
associations) and public institutions and mechanisms should exist
to address the possibility of missing markets.
In this context, the state may use tort liability as an effective
deterring tool against safety under-provision. «A “tort” is an injury
to someone’s person, reputation, or feelings or damage to real or
personal property» (CBO, 2003: VII). In the present context, tort
liability refers to punitive and compensatory damages paid by the
airline in case of an accident. Airlines may be fully insured against
such indemnities, but as argued earlier insurance premia are
expensive and their level depends on the existing airline safety
records and the level of tort liability sums. As a result, the level
of the latter has a real impact on the financial situation of an
airline. The tort liability system has generally raised concerns
about inducing irresponsible behaviour from active compensation
seekers (CBO, 2003). Nonetheless, this is likely to be minimal in
the present context as no passenger can pre-determine the exact
outcome of a possible airline accident; in the absence of extreme
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problematic aircraft, as compensation is useless in case of death
(heirs and heiresses are the sole beneficiaries).
The system of tort liability is inextricably linked to the
concepts of “strict liability” and negligence (Cooter, 1991). In the
former case, the injurer should pay damages irrespectively of
whether the injurer was at fault or not. On the other hand, under
negligence rules, liability is imposed only on injurers who fail to
comply. Strict liability is unlikely to be applied to the airline
industry as accidents may be the outcome of force majeure or
external factors beyond the airline’s direct control, e.g. a failure
in air traffic control systems. Hence, a negligence regime should
be used to condemn airlines when the accident was caused either
intentionally or in the absence of reasonable care to avoid it. A
risk-neutral, rationally self-interested airline will be deterred from
under-providing safety operations when the cost savings (from
suboptimal efforts to avoid accidents) s are less than the expected
costs of liability, the latter being equal to the product of the
probability of having an accident p, times the probability of being
found liable q, times the level of damages h. In other words,
deterrence will occur when s < p · q · h (Cooter, 1991).
The above simple mathematical expression suggests that a
large level of damages h should be a sufficient deterrent, especially
when transaction and other costs of regulation and litigation
procedures (Wolf, 2004) reduce the probability of being
condemned and hence the value of q. Nonetheless, a more through
investigation of the problem may yield some undesired results. If
h is too high, then an airline may find it hopeless to invest on
safety measures to reduce the probability of an accident p. This
is because a reduction of p beyond certain levels can become very
costly (and totally undermine profitability), whereas the product
of p times q times h remains above s. For this reason, an airline
may either decide to exit the market or stop investing in safety
just hoping to be fortunate enough to avoid an accident.
Moreover, it is also very important to consider the impact of
alternative market conducts in the airline industry and their
relationship with tort liability and the level of maintenance provision.
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decide on its corporate strategy versus its (potential or existing)
rivals; this may range from a price war and destructive competition
to full co-ordination and tacit collusion in the form of a virtual
monopoly. Nonetheless, a behaviour that restricts competition may
attract the attention of competition authorities, which may then
penalise the airlines for (individually or jointly) abusing any potential
dominant position they may possess in the marketplace. In the
present context, however, the crucial issue to investigate is the impact
of colluding behaviour on safety. If a cartel of airlines operates more
safely than carriers, which engage in extreme rivalry, then
competition authorities may have to rethink their policies when
imposing fines on colluding airlines. A related arising issue is
whether the actual market conduct should play a significant role
when assessing the power of liability sums to discipline airlines in
terms of taking all necessary safety precautions. The available
academic literature does not seem to effectively address these topics:
to further investigate them, the following parts of the paper develop
a mathematical model and discuss its policy implications.
2. - The Modelling Exercise
2.1 The Consumer’s Side
Following Yin (2000), the utility function of consumers can
be written as:
(1) U =( f + a)
β (g + γ)
1–β
s.t. pf · f + pg · g = Y
α, γ >0 and 0 < β <1
where  f is the number of flights (leaving non-integer problems
aside), g is the quantity of all other goods, pf is the average air
fare, pg is the price index of all other goods, Y is disposable income
and α, β, γ are positive parameters. For α = γ = 0, (1) reduces to
the standard Cobb - Douglas function.
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(2) L =( f + a)
β (g + γ)
1–β + λ (Y – pf · f – pg · g)
s.t. λ >0
Hence, by setting ∂L/∂f = 0, ∂L/∂g =0   and ∂L/∂λ =0   and solving




2.2 The Producer’s Side
For simplicity, we assume that flights are produced by a
monopolist airline, which is facing potential entrants in all
instances; as a result, the airline may engage in strategic
competitive behaviour (to be discussed later). The assumption of
a monopolist airline instead of an oligopoly of carriers allows us
to conveniently leave aside any real life asymmetries among
airlines (such as cost structure, revenues and reputation) and
primarily focus on issues of tort liability and market conduct. For
this reason and in order to allow for strategic behaviour, it was
decided not to use a monopolistically competitive market
structure, where the multitude of participating companies
minimizes the role of interdependence.
Flights are produced under increasing returns to scale as
follows:
(5) Cf = c0 + f (c1 + c2m)
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constant marginal cost coefficient related to flight operations, c2 is
a constant marginal cost coefficient related to aircraft maintenance
and m is the level of aircraft maintenance per flight.
We also assume that the total flight safety level is given by:
(6) S = θm + Z
where S is total safety level, θ is a positive maintenance parameter
and Z is a set of random disturbances. If the expected value of Z
is zero, that is E (Z)=0, then E (S)=θm.
Based on the above, we define the probability of having an






1 is the probability and e is the base of the natural
logarithm. For simplicity, we assume no gradients in the
seriousness of an accident, i.e. all accidents are treated the same.
The choice of the inverse exponential function is arbitrary but has
some desirable mathematical properties. In particular, for m =0 ,
J1
1 = 1, and an accident is deterministically inevitable. On the other
hand, for m →∞ ,  J1
1 → 0, so no accident occurs. Unfortunately,
however, no airline is prepared to offer an infinite level of
maintenance as it would certainly go bankrupt.
Let  H be the liability amount to be paid to victims by the
airline for each accident. In this case, the total airline cost C
becomes the sum of operating costs plus the expected liability:
(8) C = Cf + E (H)
Hence, for one flight the total cost C
1 is:
(9) C
1 = c0 + c1 + c2m + e
–θ mH
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the binomial distribution (Hogg - Craig, 1989), that is:
(10)
where the exclamation mark represents a factorial. For i =0  and
f →∞ ,  Jf
i = 0: in other words, as the number of flights tends to
infinity, the probability of having at least one accident tends to 1.
Given (10), the expected liability sum becomes:
(11)




As pointed out in the beginning of the modelling exercise, the
monopolist airline is facing potential entrants, which may
subsequently have an important impact on its competitive
behaviour. This is because of the possible prevalence of
contestability conditions in the market; in other words, the fear
of a potential entrant following a hit-and-run strategy to seize any
existing super-normal profits, may discipline the incumbent and
make it adopt a more moderate pricing strategy to discourage any
such entry. To quantify the degree of market contestability and
hence of the competitive conduct, the concept of the Lerner Index
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1 Proof of this can be found in the APPENDIX.where LI is the value of the Lerner index and MC is the marginal
cost of flights. In the case of perfectly contestable conditions and
in the absence of increasing returns to scale, pf = MC implying a
zero value for LI. In this case, the monopolist would engage in limit
pricing à la Bertrand to pre-empt any potential market entry. Since
increasing returns to scale are present in our context the least
possible value for LI is where price equals average cost AC; this is
because  AC > MC hence marginal cost pricing would lead to
financial destruction. In general, a higher value of LI is associated
with a larger divergence between price and marginal cost due to
the sustainable exercise of market power by the monopolist.
Based on the concept of the LI and using standard monopoly
theory, we may write:
(14)
where ε is own price elasticity of demand and r is a coefficient
of competitive conduct, which takes values between zero and
minus one, –1 < r <0 . When r =0 , then the standard static
monopoly outcome occurs. On the other hand, when r = –1, then
pf = MC as in the case of perfect competition or perfectly
contestable markets. This is equivalent to the case where LI =0 .
In practice, the least value of r is such that yields a price pf equal
to average total cost.
The own price elasticity of demand may be calculated as
follows:
(15)
while from (8) and (12), we have:
(16)
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(17)
Given (3) and (15), equation (17) is equivalent to the following
second degree equation with respect to f:
MC · f
2
(18) + [–2α (β –1 )MC + β (γpg + Y) r]·f
+[ α
2 (β –1 )
2 MC + α (β –1 )β (γpg + Y)] = 0
This equation has two roots, of which one is always negative and
the other one is the optimal number of flights f
*:
(19)
We note that for f
* to be positive, β must satisfy the constraint
(20)
The economic rationale behind the existence of such a lower limit
for  β lies on the assumption that flights are produced under
increasing returns to scale: hence, a very small weight of flights
in the utility function would render their production meaningless,
as demand would be too low to recover costs.
To  simplify the following discussion, we rewrite f
* as
(21)
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A =2 α (β –1 ) <0
(22) B = β (γpg + Y)> 0
D = B
2r
2 –2 AB(1 + r) MC >0
2.3 Comparative Statics
Equation  (19) may be useful in terms of answering
questions based on comparative statics. More specifically, it
makes good sense to assess the impact of an increase in
maintenance level m on the optimal number of flights f
* ceteris
paribus. To do so, the partial derivative ∂f
*/∂m is calculated. We
use the chain rule
(23)
The two partial derivatives are
(24)
(25)
The partial derivative (24) is always negative, therefore the sign
of (23) is determined by the sign of (25). If H > c2/θe
–θm then m
and f
* are positively correlated in (23). Let H
* be the value for
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* = c2/θe
–θm. By taking the partial derivatives of H
* with




Equation  (27) is always positive. Hence an increase in
maintenance level m increases  H
* and makes the condition H >
H
* more difficult to meet. In economic terms, a higher quantity
of maintenance m will lead to a decrease in the optimal number
of flights f
* (due to the associated total cost) unless the liability
amount H is sufficiently high: in the latter case, it is rational to
make more flights (at a higher safety level and lower accident
probability) to generate sufficient revenue to pay H. Moreover, if
θm > 1, then (26) is also positive. Building on the above, a
sufficient level of maintenance productivity θ will generate such
confidence in safety level S to reduce the incentive of the airline
monopolist for maintenance improvements m.
Equation (19) may also be used to highlight the relationship
between the competitive conduct r and the optimal number of
flights f
*. The monopolist airline’s competitive conduct is another
choice variable, which in reality depends on the number and type
of potential incumbents. Nonetheless, and to avoid further
complications in the mathematical modelling, the present exercise
treats  r as exogenously determined. This assumption, however,
does not invalidate the importance of calculating the respective
partial derivative ∂f
*/∂r. Using the notation of (22),
(28)
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* is positive in
equation (19), the derivative in (28) is always negative. In other
words, when r increases (tends to zero) and the competitive
conduct becomes more restrictive (i.e. competition is relaxed), the
optimal number of flights f
* decreases. This is the standard
outcome of microeconomic theory. As the monopolist becomes
able to exercise their market power, they will restrict output to
command higher prices, reduce total costs (including mainten-
ance) and hence to increase profitability.
Despite this rather trivial result, the derivative in equation (28)
is useful to apply the following chain rule:
(29)
This estimates the impact of the competitive conduct on the level
of maintenance. Based on the previous analysis, the sign of
∂m/∂f
*is determined by the sign of c2 – θe
–θmH, and ∂f
*/∂r is always
negative. Consequently, if H < c2 /θe
–θm then the derivative (29) is
positive. From equation (27) an increase in m facilitates the
condition  H < H
*; similar conclusions hold when θm >1  given
(26). In economic terms, a more restrictive competitive conduct r
(i.e. r gets closer to zero) will increase the maintenance level m
unless the liability amount H is high enough in relative terms; this
is because the restrictive monopolist will reduce the number of
flights (to increase profitability); fewer flights, however, will allow
the monopolist to increase maintenance levels and further reduce
E (H) without increasing total costs. On the other hand, when H
is relatively high, a restrictive monopolist who reduces the number
of flights will also reduce the maintenance level to generate
sufficient cost savings to cover H; this strategy is rational in spite
of raising E (H).
The above result is striking and rather against common sense,
which suggests that the obvious way to provide incentives for
safety level improvement is by raising the tort liability amount to
be paid. The mathematical model shows that the liability policy
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market tends to become more concentrated and less competitive
then it may make good sense to reduce the liability amount H.
On the other hand, as the market becomes more competitive (that
is  r goes down to –1) and the number of flights increases (and
profitability goes down), it makes good sense to increase the
liability amount; this provides an incentive for safety improvement
to counter the scale (that is the number of flights) effect on E (H).
Otherwise, maintenance levels may deteriorate, as the airline
reduces maintenance to compensate for lost profitability.
3. - Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Safety is the most important feature of the airline product par
excellence. When airline markets were heavily regulated and the
majority of carriers (at least in Europe) operated as government-
owned agencies, the pursuance and satisfaction of safety standards
was partly related to national pride: this was especially the case
for smaller or less developed states, where the aviation sector was
promoted as the modernisation facet of the society (Raguraman,
1997). Nonetheless, the situation is different in a deregulated and
liberalised airline environment, where private airlines are free to
compete against each other in various dimensions: in this context,
tort liability may be effective not only in protecting passengers but
also in accrediting the airline industry with the necessary
reputation of maintaining high safety standards thus avoiding the
potential collapse of the market due to passengers’ suspiciousness
(Knorr, 2006).
From a policy perspective, the mathematical model aims at
contributing by suggesting that the monetary level of liability
imposed on airlines should also consider an inherent feature of
the liberalised environment, namely the degree of corporate
rivalry. This steps beyond the current practice, which uses a
blanket approach on airline penalisation irrespectively of the
actual market conduct. In particular, the paper suggests that in
spite of the adverse effects that limited competition may have on
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side, which should be preserved by keeping tort liability levels low.
Conversely, if the airline market is characterised by strong rivalry
and low profitability, it is advisable to raise the liability amounts
to deter carriers from compromising safety standards. The
acknowledgement of some potential positive elements in restrict-
ing competition vis-à-vis the problems of excessive market
competition in a deregulated aviation environment is not a new
idea: for example Graham - Guyer (1999) raise environmental
concerns about the rapid increase of flights in Europe after
liberalisation. Nonetheless, this paper aims at jointly addressing
alternative market conducts using adjusting levels of tort liability
to propose a new industrial policy on aviation safety.
To  derive these conclusions, the paper assumes an airline
monopoly, which behaves strategically to face potential market
entry; its conduct effectively ranges from limit pricing (i.e. equal
to average cost to deter new airlines) to full profit maximisation
in static conditions. This approach was used as a substitute of a
detailed oligopolistic context to avoid modelling and other
complications. Although this may appear as a limitation of the
model, it is believed that the results are robust: this is because
the essence of strategic behaviour encapsulated at present by the
Lerner Index may be easily applied in a Cournot oligopolistic
model modified to account for conjectural variations (i.e. an
estimate of the sum of all rival firms’ reactions to a change in a
company’s output) as shown by Scherer - Ross (1990). Future
research may undertake this task; other suggestions to test
robustness include experimentation with alternative accident
probability functions (other than the exponential) and introduct-
ion of a safety price premium and/or safety-adjusted flights in the
consumer utility function.
Admittedly, the successful application of this new industrial
policy on aviation safety in a deregulated environment is not easy
to implement in practice. In fact, there is an issue of competence
and jurisdiction: antitrust authorities may have expertise on
assessing market power and collective dominance in the airline
market but may not have sufficient knowledge of safety issues;
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safety topics but cannot undertake a competition investigation. A
possible, though crude, solution to the problem would be to
mathematically associate the level of tort liability damages to a
structural measure of the market, such as the Hirschman -
Herfindahl concentration index (Scherer - Ross, 1990). When the
HH index is high, the tort liability amount could be automatically
reduced and vice versa. In this way, competition authorities would
be indirectly designated the competency to decide on the level of
tort liability. The problem of course is that a concentrated market
structure and the existence of a dominant position do not
necessarily imply a restrictive conduct and the abuse of market
power (Papatheodorou, 2006). Still, this association may provide
a useful benchmark; periodical reviews of the competitive conduct
on a formal basis may then introduce any necessary re-
adjustments to the level of tort liability.
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To  prove that the expected liability sum E (H) can be
simplified from equation (11) to equation (12), the following
standard result (Weisstein, 1999) is used:
By differentiating both sides with respect to x, we have
and by multiplying them by x we get
Both sides are then multiplied by (constant) H and x = e
–θm,
y=1–e
–θm =1–x are accordingly substituted to get (12).
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